Unfair deal by unknown
1Introduction
The 2012 higher education 
changes promised much. 
Ministers said they would ensure 
that universities had adequate 
resources while saving public 
expenditure. There would be no 
up-front costs for students from 
low income backgrounds, and 
their money to spend while at 
university would be increased 
through a combination of 
bursaries, grants and loans. 
Though debts would be greater, 
the repayment terms ensured 
that former students on lower 
incomes would have lower 
repayment rates than under the 
previous arrangements. 
But these features have turned 
out to cost more than anticipated, 
and so the government has 
announced measures to make 
higher education finances 
‘sustainable’. These include the 
replacement of means tested 
maintenance grants with means 
tested loans, and, subject to 
consultation, changing the 
terms of the student loans.3  
The proposed changes will 
increase the repayments for most 
students, and leave all borrowers 
uncertain as to what their 
education will eventually cost.  
What are students’ concerns?
The Chancellor, George Osborne, 
argues that there is a “basic 
unfairness” in “asking taxpayers 
to fund the grants of people 
who are likely to earn a lot 
more than them”.4  Addressing 
concerns that students from 
low income households would 
be discouraged, it has been 
suggested in the Budget 
Report  that, “students are 
more concerned about the level 
of support they receive while 
studying than the long-term 
repayment of their income 
contingent loans.” 
The Budget Report refers to a 
Universities UK (UUK) survey of 
current home undergraduates in 
support of this claim. There are 
two relevant questions. The first 
asks, “how concerned are you 
about meeting the costs of living 
during your course?”, with 21% of 
respondents saying that they are 
unconcerned, and 79% that they 
are concerned. The second asks, 
“how concerned are you about 
your ability to repay your student 
loan after your course?”, with 37% 
saying that they are unconcerned, 
and 63% that they are concerned.5
While the Budget Report is 
literally accurate, it is somewhat 
misleading. Though more 
students are concerned about 
meeting the costs of living during 
their course than their ability 
to repay their loans afterwards, 
nearly two thirds of students 
are still concerned about their 
repayments. This echoes a recent 
Sutton Trust/ComRes survey of 
16-18 year-olds, which showed 
that the majority of young people 
(58%) are either fairly concerned 
or very concerned about repaying 
student loans after they finish 
studying.6 The UUK survey also 
shows that most students fully 
understand the significance of the 
income threshold, so it should 
not be assumed that students’ 
concerns about repaying student 
loans would be the same were the 
terms of those loans to change. 
 
Key findings
•	 Changing existing loan terms is unfair on students, would undermine trust, 
and could prove unlawful and unenforceable if challenged
•	 If the repayment threshold were frozen for five years, as proposed, the 
typical borrower is estimated to repay an extra £2,800
•	 If the repayment threshold were frozen until the end of the repayment 
period, the typical borrower is estimated to repay an extra £11,000
•	 If the threshold freeze were extended to the end of the repayment period, 
women would repay an extra £12,800 and men £8,900. This is because 
women’s earnings tend to be lower and they are more likely to be repaying 
across the 30 year repayment period1
•	 Borrowers who would have been eligible for maintenance grants will see 
large increases in average repayments. This is because of their average 
loans, which will increase to over £50,000, and the effects of the proposed 
five year threshold freeze2
•	 The uncertainty created by the proposed changes effectively forces stu-
dents to write an ‘open cheque’. This may discourage participation or 
distort decisions as to where, what and how to study
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2Terms of the student loans 
The loan repayment conditions 
for entrants since 2012 include an 
income threshold, set at £21,000, 
to be uprated annually in line 
with average earnings. It was this 
feature that enabled government 
and others to reassure potential 
students that they would not be 
obliged to start repaying their 
loans until they were earning 
a decent salary. But, to reduce 
the cost to government of loans, 
and to increase the rate of 
repayments, the government 
proposes to freeze the threshold 
at £21,000 for five years.7 
There are two options:
• Option 1, government’s 
preferred option, is to freeze 
the threshold at £21,000 for 
five years from 2016. This 
change would apply to all 
students starting from 2012 
onwards; 
• Option 2 is to uprate the 
threshold by average earnings 
until 2020, after which it will 
be frozen for five years. This 
change would only apply to 
students starting from 2016 
onwards.
There are no definite proposals 
for the end of the five year freeze 
when the threshold will be 
reviewed. The loan terms also 
include a maximum interest 
threshold, but the Department 
for Business, Innovation and 
Skills (BIS) have refused to clarify 
whether it is planning to freeze 
this threshold, too.
Impact on repayments 
Table 1 shows the extra 
repayments expected from 
introducing a five year freeze 
of the repayment threshold at 
£21,000 from 2016. After five 
years the annual uprating by 
average earnings is resumed. 
The repayments are shown in 
2016 prices, calculated using 
the RPI measure of inflation for 
students borrowing £36,000 over 
three years. This is a typical set of 
conditions, giving an indication of 
the pattern of repayments. 
Over the first ten years, while 
women’s proportional increase 
in repayments is greater than 
for men, in absolute terms it 
is slightly smaller. However, 
while the overall average extra 
repayments are £2,800, men’s 
overall average extra repayments 
are £2,300, women’s £3,300.  This 
is the result of the lower average 
earnings for women (as estimated 
in the model); in general high 
earners are less affected by 
the threshold freeze, as other 
research has found.10
Apart from the case of men in 
the final ten years, the increases 
in repayments can be seen well 
beyond 2020, the last year of the 
threshold freeze. This is because 
the threshold values after 2020 
are still lower than they would 
have been. Figure 1 shows how 
the threshold changes with and 
without the repayment threshold 
freeze.
It is quite possible that the 
review after five years would not 
resume the uprating by average 
earnings. Also, the figures in table 
1 assumed that the maximum 
interest threshold would not 
be frozen. Table 2 shows the 
Table 1– Average repayments for students starting in 2014 with and 
without a payment threshold freeze (£ 2016 prices)8
Figure 1: Repayment threshold with and without five year freeze 
from 20169
3repayments which would be 
expected were both thresholds to 
be frozen, and for different post 
review options. 
 
Table 2 shows that the eventual 
cost to the students are highly 
dependent on what the review 
comes up with.  The most costly 
option for students, with the 
freeze extended for 30 years, 
would lead to an overall average 
increase of £11,000; £8,900 for 
men, £12,800 for women.  
Loss of grants with change in 
loan terms
From 2016 means tested 
maintenance grants are to be 
replaced by means tested loans, 
which, while increasing the 
income of eligible students at 
university by £550 per annum, 
bring these students’ average 
total debt burden to over £50,000. 
Without other changes the impact 
on students’ and governments’ 
finances is not as great as 
might be expected; 65 per cent 
of those who were eligible for 
full maintenance grants would 
have no increase in repayments. 
The overall average increase in 
repayments for grant eligible 
students would be £3000, but with 
a threshold freeze this increases 
to £7000.12 (NB these figures 
cannot be compared with those 
in tables 2 and 3, as they are 
discounted by RPI and 2.2 per 
cent.)
The terms and conditions for 
students’ loans include the 
following.
You must agree to repay 
your loan in line with the 
regulations that apply at the 
time the repayments are due 
and as they are amended. The 
regulations may be replaced 
by later regulations.  
Few student advisers pointed 
out and explained the potential 
consequences of this clause. 
Government ministers went out 
of their way to emphasise the 
‘generous’ repayment terms 
without any reference to the fact 
that they could be changed.
If changes are made 
retrospectively, then government, 
universities, schools and other 
student advisers could be said 
to have mis-sold loans, mostly 
to young people aged 17 and 
younger. One of those advisers, 
Martin Lewis, founder and editor 
of the Money Saving Expert 
website, now feels betrayed. 
He believes a retrospective 
change “would be terrible 
news for confidence in higher 
education”. Changing the terms 
of existing loans is unfair, would 
undermine trust, and could prove 
unenforceable if challenged. The 
one-off saving for government 
from freezing the threshold for 
all students (option 1) compared 
with keeping the original terms 
for the cohorts starting from 2012 
to 2015 (option 2) is estimated at 
£3.2 billion collected over thirty 
years. 
The long term differences 
between the two options are 
small and will depend on what 
would be decided at the five year 
reviews. 
Government’s priority is to reduce 
the national debt in the relatively 
short term; they point out that 
option 2 “would not contribute to 
the government’s fiscal objective 
of bringing down debt in this 
Parliament”.  The contribution 
by option 1 would be less than 
0.03 per cent of the national debt.  
Is this a price worth paying for 
the loss of trust, as more than a 
million borrowers see their loan 
terms change?
Long term loan terms
Even with option 2, there can be 
no assumption that the terms and 
conditions will remain unchanged 
for 2016 and subsequent starters.  
After the review, further changes 
through the repayment period 
are likely. If the principle of 
varying terms were established 
there would be a risk that future 
governments would go further, 
and use student loans as an easy 
way to raise revenue by increasing 
interest rates, introducing early 
payment charges, or extending 
the repayment period, and so on. 
So, there will have to be a much 
clearer health warning, and those 
advising students will not be able 
to provide the assurances they 
have hitherto. 
Impact on social mobility
The freezing of loan thresholds 
Table 2 – Average extra repayments for students starting in 2014 
with different changes to loan terms (£s, 2015 prices)11 
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average cost of higher education, 
particularly for students from 
low income backgrounds who are 
currently eligible for maintenance 
grants. Yet even bigger risks arise 
from the uncertainty that has 
been created. The danger is that 
this will have an adverse effect on 
the willingness of young people to 
take out the student loans.
The decision to go to university is 
usually made with the expectation 
that it will lead to a better job. 
But there is no guarantee of that, 
and students that drop out often 
have worse prospects than if 
they had got a job after A-levels. 
Even those graduating have no 
guarantee of a good job. So far 
the student loan terms have been 
seen to create a safety net: if a 
borrower ends up earning below 
the repayment threshold, there 
will be nothing to pay. But as this 
brief has outlined, this safety net 
might not be so safe in the future.
To the extent that employers are 
using degrees to signal ability, 
the cost of not going to university 
could remain high and students 
may decide they have little 
choice, so that participation rates 
continue to rise.  But students 
concerned by debt often work 
long hours during term time, 
which can lead to lower academic 
achievement. They may also 
choose their second best course 
if it has lower fees or allows them 
to live at home. Students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds are 
known to be more likely to reduce 
costs like this, which threatens 
to make the conditions of study 
more unequal, with most students 
taking longer to complete their 
studies, with a lower chance of 
success. 
Failure to complete, reduced 
academic achievement, delay in 
graduating or graduation from a 
less prestigious university, may 
all impact social mobility, adding 
to the difficulties  students from 
disadvantaged backgrounds find 
in  accessing  elite professions. 
Successive governments have 
pledged to put social mobility 
at the heart of everything they 
do. The changes to the terms 
of student loans outlined in 
this brief risk undermining that 
commitment.
Recommendations 
• No retrospective changes to loan terms should be made, but that is not enough to restore trust. The ‘get out’ 
clause should be removed and legislation to guarantee the loan terms should be introduced
• Freezing the threshold for five years introduces an unnecessary level of uncertainty, which then leads to 
the need for a review at the end of the freeze.  To reduce this uncertainty the threshold levels, both for 
repayment and maximum interest, should be set in terms of a percentage of average earnings
• New borrowers should be given definite terms, which should apply for the whole repayment period. The 
longer term risks should be borne by government, not individual students who cannot be sure of being 
amongst those successful graduates in well paid jobs
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